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The following symbols have been used throughout this paper:
... to indicate that data are not available;
to indicate that the figure is zero or less than half the final digit shown, or that the
item does not exist;
between years or months (e.g., 1991-92 or January-June) to indicate the years or
months covered, including the beginning and ending years or months;
between years (e.g., 1991/92) to indicate a crop or fiscal (financial) year.
Minor discrepancies between constituent figures and totals are due to rounding.
The term "country," as used in this paper, does not in all cases refer to a territorial entity
that is a state as understood by international law and practice; the term also covers some
territorial entities that are not states, but for which statistical data are maintained and
provided internationally on a separate and independent basis .
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I Introduction
The need to understand the factors that influ-ence the behavior of commodity prices has
taken on a special urgency in recent years, as non-
oil real commodity prices have been declining
almost continuously since the early 1980s. Since
their short-lived recovery in 1984, real non-oil com-
modity prices have fallen by about 45 percent,
translating into a sharp deterioration in the terms
of trade for most commodity-dependent exporters.
As Chart 1 illustrates, in 1992 the price of non-oil
commodities relative to that of manufactures
reached its lowest level in over 90 years.1 The long-
term behavior of real commodity prices would thus
appear to lend some support to the well-known
Pre bisch-Singer hypothesis.2 This pattern in com-
modity prices has important practical implications
for policymakers. For example, the presence of a
negative trend in commodity prices implies contin-
uously worsening terms of trade for many
commodity-dependent countries, and further that
efforts to stabilize the incomes of producers for an
extended period of time may not be financially
sustainable.
While the decline in prices has affected all
commodity-producing countries in some measure,
for some countries the growth in the volume of
exports has been of such magnitude that they have
not experienced a decline in total real earnings
from commodity exports. As can be seen from
Chart 2, industrial countries and Asian countries
have achieved sustained increases in the real value
of their commodity export earnings. Latin Ameri-
can countries have generally maintained the real
lThe source of the data plotted in Chart 1 is Grilli and Yang
(1988) for the period 1900-86 and updated by Reinhart and
Wickham (1994) for 1987-92. Throughout this paper, references
to commodity prices and exports exclude energy products.
2Basically, the. Prebisch-Singer hypothesis posits that the
long-term trend of the price of primary commodities relative to
the price of manufactures is negative-see Prebisch (1950) and
Singer (1950). Empirical evidence for the Prebisch-Singer
hypothesis is, however, not conclusive (see, for example,
Sapsford (1985), Cuddington and Urzua (1989), and Ardeni and
Wright (1992».
Chart I. Real Non-Oil Commodity Prices:
Long-Term Developments, 1900-92
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Sources: Grilli and Yang (1988); and Reinhart and Wickham
(1994).
Note: Commodity prices deflated by export unit values of
manufactured goods.
value of their commodity exports, while for the
group of African countries the commodity price
decline of the last decade has caused a sharp
decrease in the real value of exports, as the volume
of their exports has declined as well. As shown in
Chart 3, the regional pattern of the evolution of
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Chart 2. Volume and Real Value of Non-Oil
Commodity Exports
(Index Numbers: 1970 = 100)
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Development, Handbook of International Trade and Development
Statistics, 1992 (Geneva: UNCTAD, 1993).
Note: For country groupings see Table A I.
commodity exports is suggestive of similarities
across commodity groupS.3
It is to be expected that the decline in com-
modity prices will have its largest impact on coun-
tries with the least diversified production structure.
Primary commodities still account for the bulk of
exports in many developing countries. Moreover,
this group of countries, which encompasses many
of the lowest-income countries in the world, tends
to have less flexible economic systems, making sub-
stitution away from commodity production more
difficult or costly. In effect, the reliance on primary
commodities as the main source of export earnings
3Note that the huge percentage increase in exports of min-
erals and metals by the group of Middle Eastern countries
arguably did not have a major impact on markets since' they
represent a very small fraction of supply, namely, less than 2
percent by the end of 1990.
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Chart 3. Export Volumes by Region and
Commodity Grouping
(Index numbers: 1970 = 100)
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has only slightly diminished for many countries,
particularly in Africa, where manufactures often
account for less than 15 percent of merchandise
exports (see Table 1).
In this context, it is also useful to assess the
dependence of countries on a limited range of
export commodities, and how primary export vol-
umes (and market shares) have evolved over
recent years. While a more diversified export struc-
ture is not necessarily an economic objective in and
of itself, export diversification is an important way
of reducing vulnerability to volatility and sustained
declines in commodity prices.
N?t surprisingly, the performance of real export
earmngs for many developing countries during the
Introduction
Table I. Structure of Merchandise Exports:
Selected Developing Countries, 1965 and 1990
(As a percent of merchandise exports)
1965 1990
Fuels, Other Fuels, Other
minerals, primary minerals, primary
Country and metals commodities Manufactures and metals commodities Manufactures
Africa
Burundi 0 94 6 0 98 2
Cote d'ivoire 2 93 5 10 80 10
Kenya 13 77 10 19 70 II
Mauritania 94 5 I 81 13 6
Senegal 9 88 3 22 56 22
Tanzania I 86 13 5 84 II
Asia
Malaysia 34 60 6 19 37 44
Pakistan 2 62 36 I 29 70
Philippines II 84 5 12 26 62
Sri Lanka 0 99 I 6 47 47
Thailand II 86 3 2 34 64
Latin America
Argentina I 93 6 6 59 35
Bolivia 93 4 4 69 27 14
Brazil 9 83 8 16 31 53
Colombia 18 75 7 32 42 26
Mexico 22 62 16 43 13 54
Uruguay 0 95 5 0 60 40
Source: World Bank, Worfd Development Report, /992 (WashingtOn, 1992).
1980s and 1990s has been closely linked to the
countries' success in diversifying their export base,
as well as their ability to expand their primary com-
modity export volumes. As Table 2 highlights for a
selected group of countries, the Asian experience is
characterized by a marked shift toward exports of
manufactures and strong increases in real export
earnings; at the other extreme, the situation in
Africa can be generally described as one where
continued reliance on primary commodity exports
has resulted in a marked and persistent deteriora-
tion in real export earnings. But it is noteworthy
that the group of countries in Asia and Latin
America that has achieved the largest increase in
export diversification has not done so at the
expense of the production of commodities; these
countries are also among those that have increased
the volume of commodity exports the most.
This paper reviews the major recent develop-
ments in international non-oil commodity markets
and policy issues. that have arisen in connection
with these developments.4 Its purpose is essentially
threefold. First, the paper reviews some of the key
characteristics of commodity prices that may be
useful in formulating the policy response to com-
modity price shocks and in assessing the outlook
for commodity prices over the near term.s For
instance, the usefulness of a stabilization fund will
depend crucially on whether the shocks to com-
modity prices are primarily of a temporary or of a
more permanent nature.6 On a similar note, the
4The technical work that provides the background for the
analysis is included in two recent studies on the subject by
Borensztein and Reinhart (1994) and Reinhart and Wickham
(1994). The technical background to the discussion of the
macroeconomic response to uncertainty created by commodity
price shocks is provided in Ghosh and Ostry (1994).
SUnless otherwise noted, real commodity prices refer to the
IMF all nonfuel commodity price index deflated by the IMF index
of manufacturing export unit values (MEUV) of industrial coun-
tries. Both indices are in U.S. dollars. This is the traditional defla-
tor used in analysis of international commodity prices.
6See Cuddington and Urzua (1989) and Deaton (1992) .
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Table 2. Real Export Earnings, 1970-921
(Average annual percent change)
Country 1970-79 1980-92
Africa
Burundi 3.7 -3.7
Cote d'ivoire 6.1 -8.2
Kenya -3.0 -5.4
Mauritania -6.6 13.2
Senegal -0.9 3.6
Tanzania -2.7 -5.6
Asia
Malaysia 8.9 8.1
Pakistan 2.6 6.1
Philippines 3.8 3.5
Sri unka 1.2 5.9
Thailand 9.9 10.7
Latin America
Argentina 2.5 2.2
Bolivia 9.1 -0.7
Brazil 7.4 4.6
Colombia 7.4 8.5
Mexico 11.3 5.6
Uruguay 0.5 4.3
Source: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook,
various issues.
IReal export earnings defined as value of exports deflated by
import unit values.
potential benefits that can be obtained from stabili-
zation funds, or more generally from precautionary
savings, will be greater the more volatile and uncer-
tain the environment.7 Hedging strategies, as well,
acquire greater importance as volatility and uncer-
tainty increase.
Second, the study provides an assessment of the
economic fundamentals determining the decline in
commodity prices. Analyses of commodity market
developments have usually focused on macro-
economic conditions in industrial countries as the
principal factor affecting commodity prices.8 To
understand commodity price developments in the
last decade, however, it is necessary to consider the
impact of the expansion in commodity supplies and
of economic developments in transition economies.
The large increases in the volume of commodity
production have apparently been linked to a num-
ber of factors, including increasing openness and
export incentives in developing countries (in some
7See, for example, Ghosh and Ostry (1994).
8See, for instance, Dornbusch (1985) and Chu and Morrison
(1986) .
•
cases motivated by the debt crisis of the 1980s),
productivity-enhancing technological improve-
ments, agricultural policies in the largest industrial
countries, and, more recently, the surge in the
exports of various metals from the former Soviet
Union. In addition, this paper examines how recent
macroeconomic developments in transition econo-
mies, such as the sharp contraction in aggregate
demand in the former Soviet Union, have affected
the behavior of real commodity prices. The role
played by international commodity agreements is
also discussed.
Third, the paper reviews the main policy issues
raised by the recent behavior of commodity prices.
It re-examines to what extent there is a role for
government intervention and assesses the relative
merits of alternative intervention strategies. An
important distinction is drawn between two sets of
motives for government intervention. First, there is
the issue of how to react to temporary fluctuations
in commodity prices and to their volatility. The use
of price and income stabilization funds, agricultural
trading boards, and hedging strategies are some of
the policies designed to deal with this type of prob-
lem. Second, there are the issues raised by the sus-
tained decline in the real price of coinmodities.
This decline poses the question of the desirability
of structural policies that foster productivity in-
creases in the primary commodity-producing sector
and that encourage export diversification.
Concerning the characteristics of the evolution
of commodity prices, three main empirical reg-
ularities emerge from the analysis. First, the recent
weakness in real commodity prices appears to be
primarily of a secular, persistent nature, and not
the product of a large, temporary deviation from
trend. Second, the relative importance of noncycli-
calor "permanent" shocks varies considerably
across commodity groupings. Thus, while perma-
nent shocks are estimated to account for only
30 percent of the variance of metals prices, they
account for about 85 percent of the variance of
beverage prices. And third, the volatility of com-
modity prices has risen steadily and considerably
since the early 19708, particularly in the once rela-
tively stable food grouping.
The analysis of the major factors behind the
observed behavior of commodity prices reveals
that conventional factors, such as the prevailing
macroeconomic conditions in industrial countries,
are estimated to have contributed only in a limited
way to the recent weakness in real commodity
prices and that the expansion in the supply of com-
modities played a fundamental role. In addition,
while output changes in Eastern Europe and the
former Soviet Union traditionally played a rela-
tively minor role in price developments, they
Introduction
acquired an increasingly important role in the
post-1988 period.
Regarding the policy response to temporary
price fluctuations, a case has traditionally been
made for governments to influence prices received
by small commodity producers in order to smooth
their income. However, there is some evidence
indicating that private agents in developing coun-
tries may be more resourceful than usually
believed in finding ways to smooth consumption. In
contrast, governments have shown a tendency to
display less foresight, for example, by overspending
during temporary booms. Thus, institutional
arrangements, such as stabilization funds, that
establish a rule for government behavior concern-
ing revenue accruing from commodity exports can
be, in principle, useful tools. However, trading
boards and other devices for governments to
smooth incomes of producers can also easily
become distortional. In addition, the development
of financial markets for derivative securities
(futures and options) and other kinds of com-
modity-related securities offers ways for exporting
countries to trade away the risk associated with
commodity price volatility at relevant time hori-
zons and would diminish the need for income- or
consumption -smoothing policies.
With respect to possible policy responses to
longer-term declines in commodity prices, an
environment conducive to export diversification is
important, but it is not desirable to introduce dis-
tortions in order to move resources away from pri-
mary commodity production. Indeed, the ex-
perience of the high-performing Asian countries
indicates that establishing a dynamic agricultural
sector is an important phase in the diversification
process. There may, however, be a role for govern-
ment in this process to the extent that information
problems or imperfections in financial markets pre-
vent prices from transmitting the correct signals, or
agents from responding to them.
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II Characteristics of Commodity Price
Behavior
The principal aim of this section is to assess thenature of commodity price shocks and to deter-
mine to what extent the recent weakness in com-
modity prices is associated with reversible cyclical
forces, or in what measure it is part of a longer-term
secular decline. In addition, some of the more gen-
eral stylized facts about the behavior of commodity
prices that may be useful in formulating a policy
response to commodity price shocks are presented.
These include: (a) an analysis of the persistence,
duration and other features of the commodity price
cycle; (b) a quantitative assessment of the relative
importance of "permanent" shocks in explaining the
variation in real commodity prices; and (c) an assess-
ment of whether the nature of the shocks to com-
modity prices has changed over recent years and
whether the volatility of commodity prices has
increased over time.9
Trends and Cycles in Commodity
Prices
As noted earlier, it is critical, when formulating a
policy response to a commodity price shock, to dis-
entangle the trend from the cycle; the former is
associated with permanent (or at least very per-
sistent) changes while the latter is temporary in
nature. Similarly, when assessing the near-to-
medium-term outlook for commodity prices it is
important to have an idea to what extent the recent
weakness is cyclical, and therefore potentially
reversible, or in what measure it appears to be
associated with more persistent secular forces that
have a lower probability of being reversed.
There are a number of statistical methodologies
for disentangling the trend from the cycle in real
commodity prices, and the detailed results are pre-
sented in Reinhart and Wickham (1994).10 For
9Quarterly data for the period 1957:1 to 1993:11 constituted
the sample. The analysis covers the all non-oil commodity, bev-
erages, foods, and metals indices.
10 A full description of the various methodologies used and
the full results can be found in Reinhart and Wickham (1994).
The illustration provided here is based on the Beveridge-Nelson
decomposition technique. The shorter sample reflects the loss of
observations associated with this procedure.
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illustrative purposes, Chart 4 reproduces from
that paper the estimated permanent or trend com-
ponent for real commodity prices using one of the
available statistical methodologies. The difference
between the estimated permanent or trend com-
ponent and the actual price series constitutes the
estimated cyclical or temporary component.ll The
essence of the results, which is confirmed in major
part by alternative estimates of the trend and
cycle components, is as follows. Large deviations
from trend were evident in the all non-oil com-
modity, food, and metals indices during 1973, at
the time of the first oil shock. For the beverages
index, the largest deviation from trend during the
sample took place during 1977 and is associated
with a supply shock.12 With the possible exception
of the metals basket, for which the actual price is
below the estimated trend since late 1990, all the
other indices are currently estimated to be quite
close to their permanent or trend component.
This observation would seem to suggest that the
major part of the price decline during recent years
is due to more persistent causes than, say, a cycli-
cal downturn in economic activity in the major
industrial countries.
The evolution of the permanent component also
changes considerably during the sample period.
While during the 1960s and up to the first oil shock
all prices were relatively stable, the trend becomes
markedly negative from the mid-1970s onwards (for
beverages somewhat later). In addition, the cycles
are correlated across commodity groupings. The
temporary shocks that drive the cycle can exhibit
differing degrees of persistence. From a policy per-
spective, the difference between permanent changes
11It should be emphasized that the available methodologies
attempt to determine ex post the nature of commodity price
shocks; this does not imply that recent trends can simply be
extrapolated into the future. The trend is not necessarily a
simple linear function, but can itself vary over time. See
Chart 4.
12 Since coffee has a large weight in the beverage index, this
price spike is associated with a severe frost in Brazil that did
considerable damage to the trees .
Size of the Permanent Component of Price Shocks
Chart 4. Real Non-Oil Commodity Prices: Trends and Cycles,
1962:1-1993:11
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and temporary, but highly persistent ones may not
be that significant as attempts to smooth out their
consequences would run into similar difficulties.
An analysis of the duration and persistence of the
cycle indicates that it may take quite some time for
a temporary shock to fade away almost completely.
Shocks to the metals index are the least persistent
(becoming arbitrarily small in 6 to 7 quarters) and
most persistent for beverages (12 to 13 quarters).13
The temporariness of the cycle also seems to vary
considerably across individual commodities (Cud-
dington (1992».14
In sum, there is no compelling evidence to sug-
gest that the price weakness that prevailed through
13See Reinhart and Wickham (1994).
14It is worth noting that the duration of the cycles for the all-
commodity index corresponds rather well with the duration of
the business cycle (as defined and measured by the National
Bureau of Economic Research) in the United States.
mid-1993 was part of an anomalous cycle. This
means that the decline in commodity prices of the
past decade should be interpreted as being largely
permanent, in the sense that there are no forces in
play to reverse that decline automatically, as would
be the case with purely cyclical fluctuations. It
should be noted, however, that the permanent or
trend component of commodity price movements
can itself change over time and be partly random.
While there is some evidence that the downward
trend has steepened in the recent past, it cannot, of
course, be ruled out that factors influencing the
trend will be more positive in the future.
Size of the Permanent Component of
Price Shocks
While Chart 4 provides a useful visualization of
cyclical and trend movements in real commodity
•
II CHARACTERISTICS OF COMMODITY PRICE BEHAVIOR
prices, it does not provide a quantitative measure
of the relative importance of permanent shocks in
explaining the variance of changes in real com-
modity prices. Table 3 summarizes the main find-
ings on the extent to which price changes are
attributable to permanent price shocks. For each of
the four commodity indices, permanent shocks play
a role in explaining the variance of commodity
prices. However, their relative importance varies
considerably across commodity groupings. Perma-
nent shocks are least important for metals
(29 percent of the variance of yearly changes) and
most important (85 percent) for beverages. The all
non-oil commodity index, reflecting the differing
characteristics of its components, falls in the middle
of the range, with permanent shocks accounting for
about 45 percent of the variance of yearly
changes.15 For the two price indices with the
largest permanent component-beverages and
food-there is evidence that even the temporary
component of these series exhibits a high degree of
persistence. The latter observation would indicate
that, even when the shock is temporary, the costs
associated with a price (or incomes) stabilization
policy could be quite large.
Increasing Volatility of Commodity
Prices
In addition to assessing whether a commodity
price is driven primarily by permanent or transitory
shocks, it is important to consider other aspects of
the nature of the shocks when designing policy. For
instance, even if all shocks are temporary, there are
relatively few gains from setting up a stabilization
fund and/or hedging if the variance of prices is
small and large shocks are rare. The benefits that
can be obtained from stabilization funds or, more
generally, from precautionary savings will increase
in a more volatile and uncertain environment, as
greater uncertainty in a country's export revenue
stream increases the value to that country of
accumulating assets as a means of protecting itself
against future shocks.16 Similarly, hedging strat-
ISThis result is in line with the findings of Cuddington and
Urzua (1989), who, using annual data for an all non-oil com-
modity index for the period 1900-83, find that about 39 percent
of the shocks to real commodity prices are permanent.
16See Ghosh and Ostry (1994).
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Table 3. Share of the Variance of Changes
in Real Non-Oil Commodity Prices Due to .
Permanent Shocks, 1957-92 I
IAnnual data were used. All commodity price indices are de-
flated by the export unit values of manufacwres. A fuller descrip-
tion of the methodology used and more detailed results are
presented in Reinhart and Wickham (1994).
egies acquire greater importance as volatility
increases and the probability of large, destabilizing
shocks becomes higher.
Statistical analysis indicates that shocks to com-
modity prices have been larger in the latter part of
the sample than in the comparatively stable 1950s
and 19608.Several results of this exercise are worth
noting. First, the average price is markedly lower
during the most recent sample, consistent with the
presence of a negative trend, or a series of down-
ward jumps in average prices. Second, there is a sus-
tained and sharp increase in the variance of
commodity prices,17This is .evident in all the indices
but is most pronounced in the all non-oil com-
modities and food groupings; for the all non-oil com-
modities index volatility increases fivefold, while for
food the increase in the volatility measure is sixfold.
These results can be observed in Chart 5, which
plots the volatility indicator over the 1972-93
period. Following the relative tranquillity of com-
modity prices during the 19508and 1960s, the sharp
increase in volatility in the early 19708 followed a
period of expansive monetary policy in some indus-
trial countries, the breakdown of the Bretton Woods
exchange rate system, and came on the heels of the
first oil shock. However, volatility has apparently
remained high during the 19808 and 1990s.18
17This feature has also been discussed in Deaton (1992) and
Deaton and Laroque (1992).
18H is interesting to note that from a long-term perspective
the relative tranquillity of the 1950s and 1960s contrasts quite
sharply with commodity price behavior prior to World War II
and after 1974. For a discussion of volatility over the longer
term, see Boughton (1991).
Increasing Volatility of Commodity Prices
Chart S. Rising Volatility in Real Non-Oil Commodity Prices,
1972:1-1993:11
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Note: The coefficient of variation is based on IS-year moving averages and IS-year standard deviations that are backward looking, hence the
observation for 1972:1, for instance, is based on data from 1957:11-1972:1.
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III Determinants of Commodity Price
Movements
Assessing the evolution of commodity prices byapplying time-series methods has shed some
light on the persistence and increased volatility of
shocks in commodity markets. This section comple-
ments those findings by examining the economic
fundamentals that determined the decline in com-
modity prices and their relative importance. To the
extent that such economic fundamentals explain a
substantial part of the documented decline in com-
modity prices, this analysis may assist in the assess-
ment of the near-term prospects in commodity
markets.
A number of reasons have been put forward to
explain the weakness in commodity prices. Among
those explanations, the response in developing
countries to the effects of the debt crisis of the
1980s and, more recently, the economic develop-
ments in the economies in transition in Eastern
Europe and the former Soviet Union stand out as
major shocks that are likely to have exerted consid-
erable influence on commodity markets. To evalu-
ate those factors in a more systematic way, this
section will also make use of the results from a
simple aggregate econometric model of commodity
price determination (Borensztein and Reinhart
(1994». Within the framework set ~:>utin that
paper, the distinct importance of supply-side fac-
tors, in addition to demand factors, in the recent
decline in commodity prices becomes evident.
Economic Growth and the Demand
for Commodities
Analyses of commodity market developments
have usually focused on the macroeconomic condi-
tions in industrial countries as the principal factor
affecting commodity prices. Given the role of many
commodities as inputs for production by manufac-
turing industries, their demand is closely related to
the level of industrial economic activity, the major
part of which takes place in industrial countries.19
19Even with an increasing fraction of industrial activity taking
place outside the group of industrial countries, indicators of
economic activity in that group are still relatively good proxies
for world demand because of international linkages .
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Therefore, the trend decline in commodity prices
is, at least partially, related to the secular slowdown
in the growth of real output in the industrial coun-
tries that has been observed since the early 1970s,
with 1973 marking the end of the strong postwar
expansion phase for most countries.20.
In addition to the slowdown in growth, a declin-
ing intensity of resource use for some commodities,
particularly in industrial countries, has contributed
to reduced rates of growth in commodities demand.
Since 1974, for example, the growth in consump-
tion of six major metals by the Group of Seven
industrial countries has decelerated sharply and, in
some cases, consumption has declined in absolute
terms (Table 4). While there are some differences
between countries and between particular metals,
the consumption slowdown is quite general and is
linked to the slowdown in real economic growth.
However, Table 4 clearly shows the decline in the
intensity of metals use as indicated by average
annual changes in consumption per unit of real out-
put (real GDP). Thus, in addition to the slowdown
or decline in demand growth for metals engen-
dered by lower real output growth, these indicators
of intensity of metals use provide summary infor-
mation suggesting the effects of longer-term trends
in technological innovation or in structural factors
that govern metal resource usage in the industrial
countries.21
Various explanations have been put forward for
the trends observed in the intensity of metals use in
the industrial countries. Some of these explana-
tions stress the changing composition of output: the
shift away from manufacturing toward services; the
declining share in GDP of gross domestic invest-
ment, including structures, which is more metal
intensive than other components of expenditure;
and, more recently, declining output in the
20Perron (1989), among others, dates the start of the slow-
down in gross domestic product (GDP) growth at the first quar-
ter of 1973. For a discussion of the factors behind the slowdown
in growth, see, for example, Adams, Fenton, and Larsen (1987).
21Tilton (1990) has shown that this pattern holds more
broadly for member countries of the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development.
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Table 4. Intensity of Metals Use in Major Industrial Countries
(Average percentage changes)
1962-73 1974-81 1982-91
Consump- Real Intensity Con sump- Real Intensity Consump- Real Intensity
tion GDP of usel tion GDP of usel tion GDP of usel
Aluminum
United States 9.3 3.~ 4.1 -0.6 2.1 -2.9 0.3 2.3 -2.1
japan 20.3 9.5 13.0 1.1 3.6 -2.6 4.9 4.2 0.7
France 7A 4.9 3.1 3.0 2.5 0.4 3.2 2.3 0.9
Germany 9.6 4.2 6.3 3.2 1.9 1.1 3.0 2.2 0.7
Italy 10.5 S.3 7.7 4.1 3.4 0.3 5.0 2.3 2.6
United Kingdom 5.2 3.1 1.7 -4.1 0.8 -4.9 2.5 2.5 -
Canada 8.6 5.3 IA 1.3 3.8 -2.5 4.5 2A 2.0
Copper
United States 4.7 3.5 -0.6 OA 2.1 -1.9 0.6 2.3 -1.8
japan 11.2 9.5 4.2 1.8 3.6 -2.0 2.8 4.2 -IA
France 4.6 4.9 -0.2 1.2 2.5 -1.3 1.3 2.3 -1.1
Germany 2.7 4.2 0.2 0.7 1.9 -1.3 3.0 2.2 0.8
Italy 3.4 5.3 0.3 2.9 3.4 -0.5 2.7 2.3 0.3
United Kingdom OA 3.1 -5.1 -5A 0.8 ~.2 -2.0 2.5 -4.4
Canada 6.1 5.3 -2.5 0.8 3.8 -3.0 -1.4 2.4 -3.9
Lead
United States 3.5 3.5 -0.7 -2.0 2.1 -4.1 1.1 2.3 -1.2
japan 6.9 9.5 -1.5 6.1 3.6 2.2 1.1 4.2 -3.0
France 3.1 4.9 0.8 -0.3 2.5 -2.8 2.0 2.3 -0.3
Germany 3.5 4.2 -0.7 -0.3 1.9 -2.3 2.4 2.2 0.1
Italy 9.0 5.3 6.9 2.2 3.4 -IA 0.2 23 -2.1
United Kingdom 0.3 3.1 -4.2 -oA 0.8 -1.1 0.1 2.5 -2.4
Canada 3.8 5.3 -1.7 10.7 3.8 6.6 -3.8 2.4 -6.2
Zinc
United States 7.1 3.5 2.0 -5.9 2.1 -a.0 0.3 2.3 -2.1
japan 11.4 9.5 2.3 -1.0 3.6 -4.5 2.0 4.2 -2.1
France 4.0 4.9 1.1 OA 2.5 -2.2 0.8 2.3 -1.5
Germany 3.3 4.2 -0.3 -1.2 1.9 -3.3 3.9 2.2 1.7
Italy 7.9 5.3 3.0 1.1 3.4 -2.5 2.8 23 0.5
United Kingdom 1.5 3.1 -2.0 -4.8 0.8 -5.7 -0.3 2.5 -2.7
Canada 7.6 5.3 0.2 0.9 3.8 -2.8 -0.5 2.4 -2.9
Tin
United States 1.3 3.5 -3.5 -4.2 2.1 ~.3 -0.4 2.3 -2.8
japan 8.6 9.5 1.6 -2.1 3.6 -5.5 1.3 4.2 -2.7
France 1.7 4.9 -2.3 -3.3 2.5 -5.7 -0.8 2.3 -3.0
Germany -0.2 4.2 -0.2 -1.9 1.9 -3.9 4.0 2.2 1.8
Italy 4.2 5.3 -1.3 -6.8 3.4 -10.2 3.3 2.3 1.0
United Kingdom -1.4 3.1 -4.6 -5.5 0.8 ~.3 -0.5 2.5 -2.9
Canada 4.2 5.3 -2.0 -4.0 3.8 -7.5 -2.5 2.4 -4.8
Nickel
United States 5.0 3.5 -1.0 -2.1 2.1 -4.2 -0.5 2.3 -2.8
japan 17.3 9.5 9.2 1.4 3.6 -2.2 6.0 4.2 1.7
France 6.8 4.9 0.2 2.8 2.5 0.2 1.7 2.3 -0.6
Germany 8.8 4.2 4.2 3.1 1.9 0.9 1.4 2.2 -0.9
Italy 10.3 5.3 7.8 -oA 3.4 -3.9 5.4 2.3 3.0
United Kingdom 2.3 3.1 -4.3 -3.2 0.8 -4.1 3.7 2.5 1.1
Canada 8.3 5.3 0.6 -0.4 3.8 -4.0 8.2 2.4 5.4
Source: World Bank.
'Intensity of use measured as the average annual change in the ratio of consumption to real GDP.
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defense-related industries. Other explanations
focus on the role of resource-saving technologies
and the process of materials substitution. High
rates of growth in metals consumption during the
1960s were by the early 1970s generating wide-
spread fears about the future availability and price
of depletable resources (such as nonferrous met-
als), the so-called "Limits to Growth" hypothesis.22
Rising metals prices in the late 1960s, reinforced by
the price spike in 1973 that was one of the events
surrounding the first major oil shock, are believed
to have set in motion a surge in resource-saving
innovation and material substitution that is not
likely to be reversed.23
Much less information is available on intensity of
metals use outside the industrial countries. For the
former Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
(CMEA) countries, Dobozi (1990) shows that the
period of growing metals consumption and rising
intensity of use also came to an end in the
mid-1970s as output growth in the former CMEA
countries also slowed. However, rather than falling
as in the industrial countries, the intensity of metals
use stagnated or showed little change before
declining quite sharply in the 1980s. With regard to
developing countries, the rapid pace of industrial-
ization in the Asian region and in parts of Latin
America in the 19605through to the early 1980s has
been linked with rising intensity of metals use, and
appears to be related to the relatively high levels of
gross domestic investment being maintained during
this period.24 The subsequent picture is more
mixed as external finanGing difficulties lowered
investment and growth rates in many developing
countries, particularly in Africa and Latin Amer-
ica. Still, the observed trend toward less metal-
intensive technologies in industrial countries
implies that overall metals demand has not grown
as rapidly, contributing to the overall weakness in
commodity prices.
A remarkable feature of developments in com-
modity markets in the 1980s has been the vigorous
growth in the volume of imports of commodities
(Chart 6). Since 1983, the volume of imports of
22Meadows and others (1972).
23There is evidence consistent with the hypotheses. Tech-
nological progress, for example, has over time permitted metal
beverage and food containers (chiefly aluminum and tinplate) to
be made much thinner. In the area of materials substitution,
plastics, ceramics, and composites have increasingly been used,
for example, in automobile manufacturing as automakers
endeavored to make lighter and more fuel-efficient cars.
24See Radetzki (1990) .
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Chart 6. Factors Affecting Commodity
Markets
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non-oil commodities by industrial countries has
almost doubled even though, during the same
period, GDP of the industrial nations grew by less
than 30 percent. Imports of non-oil commodities
also grew faster than those of other goods, as world
imports of all types of goods increased by approx-
imately 70 percent in real terms during the same
period. This large increase in the volume of com-
modity production and trade suggests the impor-
tance of supply-side factors in explaining price
developments. These data suggest that the decline
in prices cannot be explained by demand factors
alone, and has followed from the rapid expansion
in supply outstripping the growth of demand for
non-oil commodities.
A number of factors contributing to this expan-
sion in supply have been identified. For example, in
the early 1980s, many developing countries faced
considerably more restricted borrowing oppor-
IExpansion in Supply
tumtles in international financial markets as the
debt crisis unfolded. This situation required bal-
ance of payments adjustment, which brought about
policies geared to encouraging exports and resulted
in an expansion in commodity supplies in many
developing countries.25 It could be argued that the
debt crisis may have only accelerated a necessary
shift from import substitution toward export-
oriented development strategies. Moreover, the
expansion of supply has been promoted by the pro-
cess of structural economic reform in many
developing countries (particularly in Asia and
Latin America). In particular, as countries open
their economies to international trade and adjust
their economic policies in a more market-oriented
direction, resources tend to flow towards produc-
tive sectors with comparative advantage, which
include exportable goods and, in the case of many
developing countries, primary products.
In addition, a continuous process of technologi-
cal innovation and productivity enhancement has
contributed to a persistent expansion of supplies of
numerous commodities, both in developing and
industrial countries. While there are marked dif-
ferences between commodities and quantification
is difficult, there are a number of important exam-
ples of where these technology-driven shift factors
can be shown to be important.
The diffusion of information about prices,
techniques, and marketing opportunities can bring
about significant increases in overall commodity
supplies through new entrants into international
markets. The emergence during the 1980s of, first,
Malaysia and then Indonesia as major cocoa pro-
ducers is one of the prime examples of this phe-
nomenon.26 Whereas producers other than these
two countries on aggregate increased production
by about 15 percent between 1980-81 and 1991-92,
Malaysia and Indonesia increased their combined
raw cocoa output by 500 percent in the same
period; their output share rose from just under
4 percent to 17.5 percent.27
The most remarkable examples of information
diffusion and productivity growth are found in food
crops. Despite demand growth, particularly due to
high rates of population growth in developing
countries, the rise in production has been such that
real food prices have, with the exception of a brief
episode in the mid-1970s, declined significantly in
2SSee, for example, Aizenman and Borensztein (1988) and
Reinhart (1991).
26For details, see Reinhart and Wickham (1994).
27COte d'Ivoire also expanded cocoa production in the 1970s
and 19805 and increased its market share. However, both
Ghana's and Nigeria's share declined significantly.
the postwar period.28 While land under cultivation
has increased in many parts of the developing
world, a sustained increase in yields over time has
played a major role in the agricultural supply-
demand equation. Advances in agroscience that
have led to the development of higher-yield and
more disease-resistant varieties, the increased use
of fertilizers and pesticides, and the spread of irri-
gation, are the principal factors cited for the
increases in cereal yields (see Chart 7). The
improvement in yields was a more or less contin-
uous process in the agricultural sectors of the
industrial countries, but in the developing countries
sharp increases occurred more recently. High-
yielding wheat and rice varieties were introduced
in a number of developing countries and the rate at
which high-yielding varieties were adopted was
often rapid.
The improvements in technology are likely to be
"irreversible" in nature and are not limited to a few
commodities. These developments have had wide-
spread effects and have led to improving yields for
many types of crops, including the beverages
(cocoa, coffee, tea), oilseeds, vegetables, and agri-
cultural raw materials, such as cotton. It seems
likely, particularly in light of recent major advances
in biotechnology, that in the future as in the past
innovation and information diffusion will continue
to playa significant role in increasing agricultural
yields still further.
National (or transnational in the case of the
European Union (EU)) agricultural policies in the
industrial countries typically have also acted to
stimulate output and discourage consumption,
thereby reducing import needs or increasing sup-
plies available for export. Such government inter-
vention has been a common feature in industrial
countries in the postwar period; however, a marked
deterioration in the agricultural trade environment
took place in the 1980s in part owing to increased
subsidies to agriculture. Prices of many agricultural
commodities fell considerably, the budgetary and
other burdens associated with price support
schemes grew, and trade disputes became
increasingly acrimonious between agricultural
exporters, both developed and developing. The
case of wheat provides an instructive example.
Price support under the EU's Common Agri-
cultural Policy has been so effective that wheat
supplies surplus to European requirements have
grown over time and, assisted by the provision of
export subsidies, have had to be sold on world mar-
kets. Between 1980-81 and 1991-92, wheat exports
28The price of services such as transportation, packaging, pro-
cessing, and retailing has generally been rising over time, tend-
ing to offset the impact of lower "raw" food prices on retail food
prices.
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Chart 7. Cereal Yields by Region
(In thousand kilogramslheaare)
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from the EU rose by 55 percent to nearly 22 million
tons (an increase in market share from 14 percent
to 20 percent). In order to counter EU penetration
in its traditional markets, the United States intro-
duced the Export Enhancement Program in 1985.
The so-called "subsidy war" contributed to lower
international wheat prices to the detriment of other
wheat exporters.
While trade in wheat has been perhaps the most
notable source of contention, other grains and
commodities (e.g., meat, sugar, oilseeds) have been
affected by price support schemes. There is little
doubt that the agricultural policies of industrial
countries have been a factor in the rapid expansion
in world commodity supplies during the 1980s,
which has contributed to the weakness in prices for
certain agricultural products. Liberalization mea-
sures, including a phased reduction in export sub-
sidies to be implemented under the recently
•
concluded Uruguay Round, should improve price
prospects for a number of agricultural products.29
International Commodity Agreements
The weakening of commodity prices during the
1980s and 1990s has often been attributed in part to
the breakdown of international commodity agree-
ments (ICAs) designed to help stabilize prices and
ensure a reasonable rate of return to commodity
producers.3o Several such agreements were in
effect during the 1970s and early 1980s, but in June
1984 the agreement covering sugar collapsed.
Thereafter, other agreements followed suit or
became economically moribund-tin (October
1985), cocoa (February 1988), coffee (July 1989),
and natural rubber (April 1993). The immediate
impact· on price of a breakdown in a commodity
agreement may have a large "temporary" compo-
nent as, for instance, when beverage prices fell
below trend from mid-1987 to mid-1989
(Chart 4).31However, the effects of the breakdown
are likely to have an important "permanent" com-
ponent, as the behavior of exporters who partici-
pated in the ICA adjusts to the more competitive
regime. In part, however, the breakdown of the
numerous agreements reflects the difficulties of try-
ing to influence prices by managing output or by
other means in the face of developments (such as
productivity increases) acting to foster an expan-
sion in supplies.
Developments in Economies in
Transition
Since 1990, another major shock affecting com-
modity markets has been the aftermath of eco-
nomic developments in Eastern Europe and,
particularly, the former Soviet Union. These coun-
tries are large participants in international trade in
commodities, both as importers (especially of
grains) and as exporters (particularly of metals).
Their demand for imported commodities fell con-
comitantly with the fall in output and aggregate
demand that followed the collapse of the centrally
planned economic systems. Some examples of the
29Most partial and general equilibrium models suggest that
real prices for most agricultural products would rise if reforms
were implemented by the industrial countries. See Goldin and
Knudsen (1990).
30See, for example, Maizels (1992). Conversely, it can be
argued that it was the large expansion in supplies by countries
outside the agreements that contributed to the ICAs' demise.
31Unless the breakdown of the ICA was fully anticipated, in
which case, prices would have already reacted .
Developments in Economies in Transition
Table S. Demand for Selected
Commodities of the Former Soviet Union
Import
Volumes
Former Soviet Union
Share of World
Percent Change Imports, 1989
1989-92 (In percent)
--48.1 4.8
-62.7 26.0
-55.7 26.9
-17.0 21.3
Cocoa I
Corn
Tea
Wheat2
Sources: E.D. and F. Man Cocoa Ltd., Cocoa Market Report
(London. 'various issues); International Tea Committee. Annual
Bulletin of Statistics (London. various issues); and U.S. Department
of Agriculture. Worfd Groin Situation and Outlook (Washington.
various issues).
IGrindings of raw cocoa.
2Percent change is through November 1993.
decline in imports of commodities by the former
Soviet Union are shown in Table 5. But the impact
of the Eastern European shock was probably more
pronounced in the metals markets, where .the for-
mer Soviet Union is an important suppher, and
where dramatic increases in exports were observed
in some cases. For example, zinc exports from the
former Soviet Union rose by nearly 700 percent
during 1989-92.
As can be seen in Table 6, the increase in exports
of metals was to a large extent a reflection of the
large decline in domestic demand for metals in t~e
countries of Eastern Europe and the former SOViet
Union, which responded to the declines in ~he level
of activity in the defense industry and m .other
poorly competitive manufactures, and to diSrup-
tions in CMEA and interrepublican trade. Other
factors may have also contributed to the increase in
the volume of exports of metals, principally the
increased profitability in energy-intensive metals
production and ,exports (due to the still very low
domestic price of energy), a reduction in stock lev-
els that are no longer justified from national
security or economic standpoints, a~d some eXJ?ort
activity conducted principally to buIld up holdmgs
of foreign assets.
In some cases, discrepancies between domestic
and international prices in the context of only par-
tial price and trade liberalization have created
arbitrage opportunities and contributed to the
sharp increase in exports to western markets.32
32 Effective early in 1993, domestic prices for metals were fur-
ther liberalized and other steps were also taken to reduce the
scope for illegal trading.
Table 6. Supply of Selected Commodities
from the Former Soviet Union
Export
Volumes
Former Soviet Union
Share of World
Exports, 1992
(In percent)
Percent Change
1989-92
Aluminum
Copper
Zinc
219.4
71.2
686.0
Source: World Bureau of Metal Statistics. Worfd Metal Statistics
(London. various issues),
Nickel prices in late 1992, for example, were
US$1,800 per ton for domestic deliveries to Rus-
sian state enterprises, US$3,OOOper ton on the
Moscow Commodity Exchange, and nearly
US$6,OOOper ton on the London Metal Exchange.
Not surprisingly, smuggling and bypassing of regu-
lar domestic and export trade channels reportedly
flourished during the first phase of the reform pro-
cess, aided by the growth in unmarked and
unprotected international borders between the
newly independent states. The Baltic countries are
reported to have become leading exporters of alu-
minum, copper, and nickel from the former Soviet
Union, which suggests that much of the irregular
trade took place via Russia's traditional conduits to
the West,33 Overall, developments in Eastern
Europe and the former Soviet Union have gene.r-
ated increases in exports of metals and drops m
imports of grains and other commodities, contrib-
uting to the observed weakness in the aggregate
prices of primary products.
In general terms, it does not appear that
developments in Eastern Europe and the former
Soviet Union will affect commodity prices in a per-
manent way. While the restructuring of indu~t~ial
production into a more marketable compOSition
may take some time and gains in the efficiency of
resource use can be expected, it will eventually
induce a recovery in domestic demand; unnecess-
ary stocks of metals will be run down, the eventual
adjustment of domestic energy prices will reduce
excess profitability, and a more complete price and
trade liberalization-along with the privatization
of industry-will eliminate incentives for arbitrage
33 It seems quite likely that the customs data reported in
Table 6 underestimate former Soviet Union exports to western
markets. Some industry sources estimate exports of aluminum
from the former Soviet Union in 1992 at about 1.2 million tons,
of which it is estimated that 0,4 million tons were smuggled out.
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or capital flight-motivated exports. However, it is
difficult to predict the level of metals exports that
will be sustained once the transformation of the
economies of the former Soviet Union republics is
completed.
The main conclusions from a recent econometric
study (Borensztein and Reinhart (1994)) are that
the weakness in commodity prices since 1984 can-
not be explained by the two factors that have been
conventionally linked to the determination of com-
modity prices: the level of economic activity in
industrial countries and the real exchange rate of
the U.S. dollar. Instead, a more accurate picture is
obtained by including proxy variables that would
take into account two main developments: the
booming supply of exports of primary products,
and the change in the net international demand for
commodities of the former Soviet Union.
The improvement in predictive performance can
be observed in Chart 8, which displays the three
estimated specifications. Model 1 includes conven-
tional demand-side determinants only; model 2
adds a supply proxy to the estimated equation; and
model 3 extends model 2 by incorporating the tran-
sition economies into the measure of world
demand. The poor forecasting performance of
model 1 after 1984 and the much more adequate
performance of models 2 and 3 are evident from
this chart.
The econometric results also permit an estimate
to be made of the relative importance of the dif-
ferent factors that have determined the decline in
the prices of commodities during the last decade. It
suggests, for example, that industrial production in
industrial countries explained 25 percent of the
variation of commodity prices in the period 1971-
84, but just over 5 percent for 1985-88. By contrast,
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Chart 8. Real Non-Oil Commodity Prices:
Actual and Forecasts
1.3
1.2
1.1
1.0
0.9
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
1971
the supply expansion explained about 40 percent of
the variation for the period 1971-84, and over
60 percent for the period 1985-88.
The current trend toward recovery in growth in
industrial countries will help to relieve downward
pressures in commodity markets, but it appears
unlikely that it will reverse the declines of the past
decade. On the basis of the econometric results,
5 percent growth in industrial countries over the
next two years (consistent with current IMF projec-
tions) would generate an increase of between 6112
and 9 percent in real commodity prices over the
same period. For that increase to materialize, how-
ever, it would be necessary that other factors, in
particular the trend increase in supplies and the
economic developments in the former Soviet
Union, exert a neutral influence on commodity
markets over the next two years.
IV Policy Issues
The previous sections of the paper have exam-ined how commodity prices have behaved
over recent years and discussed possible explana-
tions for the observed behavior. Both the volatility
in real commodity prices and the downward trend
experienced over recent years present serious chal-
lenges for many developing countries because of
the impact on export earnings, domestic incomes
(and hence private savings and investment), and
government budgetary positions. The response to
volatility in commodity prices, however, gives rise
to issues that are quite different from those ema-
nating from secular changes in the average level of
prices. It is therefore crucial to interpret correctly
market developments in each case in order to elab-
orate the appropriate policy response or, in fact, to
consider whether a policy response is warranted at
all.
Temporary Price Shocks
Temporary shocks to commodity prices affect
both the private and public sectors in the
commodity-producing countries. In addition, com-
modity price shocks can have large effects on the
macroeconomic and balance of payments position
of a commodity exporter, and also affect a coun-
try's access to private international financial mar-
kets because of sovereign risk considerations.
When facing temporary changes in income, the
optimal response by individual consumers is to use
saving and borrowing in an attempt to smooth the
path of consumption. Similarly, governments facing
temporary changes in revenue should adjust their
spending to be consistent with sustainable levels.
Traditionally the argument has been made that
governments should assume most of the con-
sequences of temporary commodity price changes
and take an active role in helping to smooth
income for private producers. These policy actions
are often implemented through special institutional
arrangements such as agricultural boards, with
price stabilization as a major objective. Further-
more, international efforts to influence world
prices through buffer stock operations and/or
export restraints have been pursued through inter-
national commodity agreements. Another reason
for intervention is that in some cases, particularly
for countries with a heavy dependence on minerals
and metals, there is a concern with how best to
handle fluctuations in government revenues.34
Role of Government in Smoothing Income
Before examining some of the policy prescrip-
tions that have been advanced to help deal with
international commodity price variability and its
macroeconomic effects, it is worth considering
whether it is desirable to split the effects of tempo-
rary commodity price movements on private pro-
ducers and on government.
A traditional argument for government to
absorb the effects of commodity price fluctuations
is based on microeconomic considerations relating
to the behavior of private agents.35 If private
agents bear all the commodity price risk (and sup-
ply is inelastic in the short run), they will face vari-
able and unpredictable income streams over time,
with possibly very limited opportunity to smooth
consumption. Therefore, it may be optimal for the
government to intervene to stabilize the prices
received by private agents and thus enhance the
welfare of risk-averse individuals by permitting
smoother income and consumption streams. How-
ever, some additional assumptions are necessary to
support this argument. For example, it can be
argued that producers face liquidity constraints,
because of underdeveloped financial systems or
owing to information problems, so that it is not
possible for them to borrow when commodity
prices are temporarily low.36 The implicit assump-
34An additional argument for government intervention that is
sometimes put forward is that large temporary shocks if fully
passed on to producers may induce persistent (or permanent)
effects on supply. In the case of tree crops, for example, replace-
ment plantings may cease, leaving productive capacity reduced
for a lengthy period of time and resulting in loss of market
share.
35See Newbery and Stiglitz (1981) and Deaton (1992).
36But note that governments may also face liquidity con-
straints in international financial markets because of market
imperfections or sovereign risk considerations.
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tion may be that individual agents lack the fore-
sight or the means to engage in suitable savings
strategies, or they lack the information to form rea-
sonable expectations about the nature of com-
modity price shocks. Or alternatively, the
assumption may be that income levels in many
countries are so low that consumption spending by
agricultural smallholders, for example, is close to
subsistence levels with the result that the ability of
producers to engage in precautionary saving is
minimal.
Empirical evidence on savings behavior in
developing countries is far from conclusive, but it
does suggest that consumption smoothing takes
place to a larger extent than traditionally assumed.
At the macroeconomic level, one strand of litera-
ture has found that consumption behavior in some
developing countries has often been close to what
would be predicted on the basis of a standard per-
manent income mode1.37 The implication of these
studies is that, in the face of fluctuations in income
streams due to commodity price shocks and other
disturbances, consumption paths in a number of
developing countries have still been relatively
smooth. As might be expected, however, this seems
to be more the case for countries with higher
income levels than for low-income countries in
Africa and elsewhere.
The issue of whether developing countries have
built up precautionary financial balances to act as a
buffer or insurance policy in.the face of changes in
the underlying volatility of their export earnings
has also been examined.38 According to the pre-
cautionary savings hypothesis, a consumer would
build up a larger stock of financial assets the more
volatile or unpredictable is his or her income. For a
country as a whole, the volatility of export reve-
nues creates an aggregate need for precautionary
savings, which can only be accumulated through a
more positive current account balance (savings
minus investment). Looking at aggregate data for
the current account for a large panel of developing
countries, it has been found that the volatility of
export earnings had a significant effect on the cur-
rent account outcome, in conformity with the pre-
cautionary savings hypothesis. These results
suggest that a considerable number of developing
countries do indeed attempt to build up precau-
tionary savings balances when they perceive an
increase in the volatility of their export earnings.
Note that, since the current account is the result of
decisions by both private agents and the govern-
ment sector, these test results apply to the aggre-
37See Ostry and Reinhart (1992) and Ghosh and Ostry
(1993).
38See Ghosh and Ostry (1994).
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gate behavior of the private and public sectors
toward the volatility of export revenues.
At the micro economic level, although the avail-
ability of data seriously limits the number of cases
that can be studied, the evidence that agents react
to commodity price instability in a manner consis-
tent with theory is perhaps even more suggestive.
This is because micro economic survey data provide
a better description of individual saving behavior
than aggregate macroeconomic data. It has been
found that rice farmers in Thailand, for example,
smooth their consumption quite successfully both
within and between harvest years.39 Evidence from
Ghana further suggests that smallholders are capa-
ble of making sensible intertemporal choices
between consumption and savings.4o Also, an anal-
ysis of the coffee boom in Kenya of 1976-79 found
that as much as 60 percent of boom income went
into private savings; farmers were aware that the
boom was due to frost damage in Brazil and that
their income gains were largely of a windfall
nature. In contrast, it was estimated that the Ken-
yan government increased its spending by more
than the increase in revenue generated by the cof-
fee boom.41 At a minimum, the evidence at both
the macroeconomic and micro economic levels sug-
gests that governments may be well advised to
reassess their intervention strategies and the
responsibility they assume for managing com-
modity price risk at the country level.
All in all, while in principle a case can be made
for a government role to help smooth the incomes
of private commodity producers because of finan-
cial market imperfections and information prob-
lems, there is empirical evidence to support the
view that the private sector often tends to find ways
of smoothing consumption in the face of com-
modity price shocks. Moreover, the experience
with commodity price booms indicates that govern-
ments can find it difficult to manage properly the
proceeds of temporary revenue windfalls. Thus, to
the extent feasible, it seems advisable to adopt the
policy of not interfering with price signals and
using other means to deal with the side effects of
price shocks. For example, the effects of com-
modity price fluctuations on low-income producers
could be better addressed by resorting to social
safety net measures.
Intervention Strategies
In part for the reasons discussed above, many
governments in commodity-producing countries
39See Paxson (1992).
40See Ingham (1973).
41See Bevan, Collier, and Gunning (1989). Cuddington (1989)
examines the fiscal difficulties experienced by Kenya, Nigeria,
and Jamaica associated with commodity export booms .
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have chosen to assume a role in attempting to deal
with the effects of fluctuations in international
commodity prices on the domestic economy. In
some metal- or mineral-exporting countries, the
mining and refining companies are often partially
or wholly owned by the state, which in addition to
returns from holding equity may also levy export
and income taxes. In countries exporting primary
agricultural commodities, many governments levy
significant export taxes that take on various forms
(specific, ad valorem, adjustable levies) so that
commodity price fluctuations may generate reve-
nue instability. In other cases, state intervention
takes the form of operating parastatal marketing
boards. These boards typically set producer prices
considerably below international prices and do not
change them for lengthy periods of time in
response to changes or trends in international
prices. These kinds of arrangements tend to stabil-
ize (at a lower level) the incomes of private agents
while the fluctuations in international commodity
prices are transmitted directly to the general bud-
get via export taxes and/or the operating surplus of
the parastatal marketing board. In some cases,
however, the impact of commodity price fluctua-
tions impinges in the first instance on the incomes
of commodity-producing agents in the economy,
and only indirectly on the fiscal position.42
The institutional structure can thus have an
important influence in determining the aggregate
impact on the economy of changes in international
commodity prices and how macroeconomic stabili-
zation and adjustment are effected. The nature of
the intervention performed by these institutions
has been varied, but the most often-used strategies
are outlined below.
Stabilization Funds
Stabilization funds have been designed to deal
with the impact of commodity price volatility on
government revenues, especially in countries with a
heavy dependence on metals and minerals. These
funds act as a buffer for government expenditures
and financing and have at least two appealing fea-
tures. First, they impose a rule on governments,
designed to use resources optimally from a long-
term perspective, even if the effective planning
horizon of the government is much shorter. The
rule should lessen the risk that governments may
be tempted to increase spending excessively during
42In Kenya, for example, export taxes are relatively minor
and booms and slumps in world coffee and tea prices are
reflected to a large extent in domestic producer prices; the gov-
ernment's budgetary position is largely affected by how private
agents react in terms of consumption and investment decisions.
These indirect effects can, nevertheless, be substantial.
temporary booms. And second, they constitute an
institutional device by which governments can even
out their expenditure, given that countries, as well
as individuals, may be limited in their ability to
smooth spending by imperfect access to interna-
tional financial markets.
One scheme of this type has been put in place in
Papua New Guinea whereby government revenues
from mining are placed in the Mineral Resource
Stabilization Fund (MRSF) whose assets, after
accounting for drawdowns by the Government, are
interest-bearing securities and deposits with the
Bank of Papua New Guinea, the counterpart of
which consists mainly of foreign deposits and
securities. The Copper Stabilization Fund in Chile
is another example of a formal institutional struc-
ture intended to save at least part of the gains real-
ized by state-owned mining considered likely to be
temporary, for use when copper prices drop.
The implementation of such schemes, however,
is not without difficulties. One major problem is to
set an appropriate benchmark price in order to
determine at what rate disbursements should be
made from the fund. For the MRSF in Papua New
Guinea, for example, mining revenue projections
were made over a five-year planning horizon based
on price and output forecasts. In practice, year-to-
year revisions in the rolling horizon revenue fore-
casts led to considerable variations in the govern-
ment drawdowns recommended by the MRSF each
year.43
Agricultural Boards
The other principal type of institutional structure
for government intervention has been the state-
owned agricultural board or fund. These are usu-
ally charged with a domestic price stabilization
function, the transfer of explicit export taxes to
central government, and a role in determining the
extent to which operating surpluses are channeled
into a formal stabilization fund or are transferred
directly to central government (or to other uses). In
COte d'Ivoire, for example, the first objective was
achieved by declaring a fixed producer price in
nominal terms for coffee and cocoa. The board was
able to stabilize producer prices (and thus pro-
ducers' income) until international prices began
dropping in 1986, which exerted increasing pres-
sure on the organization's financial position. In
1989, the Government suspended the explicit
export taxes, but even so was obliged to cut pro-
ducer prices in half in 1990 in an attempt to limit
43See Claessens and Coleman (1991), who found that the
variation in government drawdowns over the 1980-88 period
was only modestly lower than that of government mining reve-
nue accruals.
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the operational deficit of the parastatal. During
much of the period prior to 1986, fluctuations in
international prices showed up primarily in the rev-
enues of general government via the operating sur-
pluses of the board. At times, particularly during
the extraordinary beverages boom of 1975-78 and
the smaller boom in the mid-1980s, these revenues
became very large and were principally used to
finance spending on urban infrastructure and other
development projects.
While similar schemes operated elsewhere in
Africa, some other countries operated agricultural
stabilization schemes quite differently. Papua New
Guinea, for example, had schemes for coffee,
cocoa, copra, and palm oil that used a ten-year
moving average of inflation-adjusted commodity
prices as the basis for paying bounties and mount-
ing levies on actual free-on-board prices. As inter-
national prices declined in the mid- to late 1980s,
however, many of these programs experienced dif-
ficulties as drawdowns began to exhaust the funds.
The experience with stabilization schemes raises
a number of issues about their desirability. First,
stabilization schemes that transfer most of the
effects of commodity price fluctuations to govern-
ment may in fact be prone to exacerbating a coun-
try's fiscal management problems.44 For some
countries the exercise of sufficient control over
government expenditure is likely to pose serious
difficulties, and there is some evidence to suggest
that government responses to revenue gains and
losses from commodity price fluctuations are asym-
metric.45 That is, it has proved much easier to
adjust public expenditures upwards in boom peri-
ods than to adjust them downwards in slump peri-
ods. This reinforces the point made earlier that it
may well be advisable for governments to share
more of the commodity price risk with the private
sector, particularly if reforms can also be under-
taken to remove certain impediments (such as
strict capital controls) that hinder the private sec-
tor's ability to handle fluctuations in commodity
incomes.46
The situation may be further complicated by the
fact that, to achieve a significant amount of income
smoothing, it may be necessary for a fund to hold a
relatively high level of foreign reserves or be in a
position to borrow not insubstantial funds from
international capital markets for stabilization pur-
poses during downturns in commodity prices. The
need for a relatively high level of foreign reserves
(on average) arises from the fact that temporary
44See Cuddington (1989).
45See Deaton (1992).
46This does not mean that the agricultural sector should not
be taxed; rather it means that the fonn of taxation needs to be
reformulated.
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commodity price shocks show considerable per-
sistence and revert relatively slowly to trend. More-
over, holding such levels of foreign reserves will
have a high opportunity cost as the rate of return
on investment in most capital-short developing
countries will be considered to exceed the rate of
interest paid on foreign reserve holdings. This fac-
tor and the political pressures that may arise make
such a reserves management strategy difficult to
implement. In addition, during boom periods it
may prove more difficult to enforce discipline on
following appropriate project selection criteria,
with the result that low-quality projects may be
undertaken. Regarding international borrowing,
many developing countries do not enjoy a credit
rating that would enable them to obtain significant
resources from private sources. Moreover, even for
countries with some degree of access to interna-
tional financial markets, financing may be more dif-
ficult to obtain, and more expensive, at time~ when
commodity export prices fall, as this would create a
less favorable outlook for the balance of payments.
Second, even if improvements to the institutional
framework for stabilization schemes were to be
implemented, they are still vulnerable to the diffi-
culty of ascertaining ex ante the appropriate price
level around which incomes should be stabilized.
This requires an evaluation of the temporariness of
price shocks and whether and how the underlying
trend is changing. In particular, the difficulties that
many stabilization schemes experienced from the
mid-1980s onward may be traced to a failure to
take into account the downward trend in com-
modity prices. Forecasting the future path of com-
modity prices is a notoriously difficult exercise, but
the analysis presented earlier in this paper suggests
that it might be possible to improve the working of
stabilization schemes by paying greater attention to
how particular commodity prices are evolving over
time. The analysis of the beverages price index, for
example, indicated that quite a large percentage of
the shocks over recent years have been of a secular,
persistent nature requiring adjustment in exporting
countries. Temporary shocks do occur in the bev-
erages markets, and when they occur they appear
as price spikes generally associated with events
such as the Brazilian frost in 1975 that led to a
temporary boom in coffee prices. Thus, it makes
little sense to put in place a domestic price stabili-
zation scheme that does not take account of such
factors and tries to stabilize prices around a con-
stant mean in nominal or real terms. What might
make more sense for designers of such schemes is
to make estimates of the recent trend for the com-
modity price in question (which should be updated
continuously), set up an intervention band based
on the evolving properties of the price series, and
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intervene only when shocks push prices outside the
band.
International Commodity Agreements
As volatility in international commodity prices
affects the economies of all primary product
exporters, there is an obvious basis for the ide~ of
cooperative commodity agreements of some kmd
with the aim of attempting to achieve greater sta-
bility in international commodity prices. There may
also be similar interest in importing countries, but
it is likely to be less acute as their import structures
generally tend to be much more diversified. Experi-
ence with ICAs has not in general shown them to
have been successful.
Two aspects of ICAs should be differentiated.
First, ICAs may attempt to increase the mean price
of a commodity by restricting its supply by some
method. And second, ICAs may simply limit price
variability, for example, by recourse to buffer
stocks. The first aspect is not considered favorably
by importing countries and has be~n a source of
contention, while the second one IS perhaps less
controversial. However, it is hard to pin down how
much price stability is desirable; presumably, some
degree of price flexibility must be allowed so that
prices can provide the necessary signaling function
for producers and consumers alike. More impor-
tantly, an -ICA (or a producer-only scheme) runs
the risk of trying to stabilize prices around the
"wrong" (non-market-clearing) price, which can
quickly lead to financial nonviability, the same
problem discussed in the case of agricultural
boards above or to the collapse of output-sharing
arrangements: On both political and economic
grounds the prospects for ICAs play~ng a ro.Ie in
addressing the issues raised by recent mternatlO~al
commodity price behavior appear somewhat dIm.
External Compensatory Finance
Another means of trying to smooth out the
effects of negative, temporary commodity. price
shocks for credit-rationed developing countnes has
been external compensatory finance from the IMF
under the compensatory financing facility (CFF)
and subsequently the compensatory and con-
tingency financing facility (CCFF) and from the
European Community under the STABEX
scheme.47 The IMF's CCFF is designed to work
47It should be noted that such compensatory finance is a loan
or a grant to the monetary authority or government of the coun-
try concerned. It need not, therefore, necessarily find its way to
those who may be most directly affected by an export shortfall.
best when temporary price shocks hit export earn-
ings over a short period (the so-called "shortfall
year"); then the destabilizing impact of the tempo-
rary shock can be offset in part by drawing under
the facility, subject to early identification of the
shortfall, access limits, and an appropriate policy
response. In a similar vein, the contingency ele-
ment of the CCFF is designed through a mix of
financing and adjustment to help protect the pro-
grams of member countries being supported by
IMF resources from being thrown off course by
unanticipated shocks to key exogenous var~ables,
such as commodity prices. Clearly, the deSIgn of
policy responses and the form of IMF assistance to
member countries must take into account the
nature of the commodity price shock, namely
whether it can be expected to be a short-lived, tem-
porary shock or one that is likely to be longer
lasting.
Market-Related Instruments
In addition to the possibility of reacting ex post
to commodity price changes, it is possible for coun-
tries to trade away much of the commodity price
risk, and the accompanying macroeconomic distur-
bances, by using financial securities such ~s ~utur~s
and options. Producer countries can then lImIt th~lf
exposure to unanticipated price changes whIle
investors in other countries assume it. In this way,
risk is shifted internationally. But financial transac-
tions of this sort at best insulate the economy from
the problem of uncertainty, and at a cost. They do
not avoid the effects of anticipated temporary or
secular declines in prices.
The rise in short-run volatility of commodity
prices since the early 1?70s has increased. ~he
attractiveness of hedging mstruments. In addItion
to well-developed futures and options markets with
short-dated instruments for commodities that
account for a significant part of total commodity
trade, financial innovation has led to developments
in other instruments (commodity swaps, com-
modity options, commodity-linked bonds, f~}f-
wards) that have increased the scope for hedgmg
commodity risk. Such financial instruments have
the advantage over other means of trying to handle
risk in that they transfer much of the risk to parties
outside the country concerned. Nevertheless,
establishing a coherent hedging strategy is not a
straightforward proposition and the u~e .by
developing countries of futures and denvatIve
markets has only increased relatively slowly. It
was for these reasons that both the World Bank
and the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development created technical assistance pro-
grams focused on _increasing awareness of external
•
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exposure in developing countries and providing
assistance in risk management implementation.48
Here again it is necessary to take account of the
institutional, marketing, and financial framework
as it affects commodity price risk and who bears it.
In countries where exporters face much of the com-
modity price risk, exchange controls may well rule
out commodity hedging by the private sector and
thus preclude optimal borrowing and lending
behavior; changing this state of affairs may well
help in reducing uncertainty and smoothing export
earnings.49 Physical and price regulation of com-
modity exports constitutes an additional barrier to
private sector hedging. In other cases, marketing
institutions, marketing boards, or private exporters
may act as simple intermediaries buying from small
producers and arranging sales and shipments
abroad. Some advance payments to producers may
be made, but final settlement may await the end of
the crop year; the intermediaries may have little
incentive to hedge so that most of the commodity
price risk is transferred to the small producer who
is least able to protect himself. By marketing
reform and amending marketing regulations it may
be possible to reapportion the price risk and
encourage those who are better placed to hedge to
do so through the use of short-dated instruments.
Using exchange-traded futures contracts and
options purchases can allow countries to offset
some of the exposure to risk due to price volatility
at the higher frequencies. Maturities tend to be lim-
ited to one to two years and market thinness can
become a problem for the longer-dated maturities.
There are also the costs of hedging in the form of
brokerage fees and the need for agents to fulfill
margin requirements (and prospective margin
calls) or pay options premia in order to gain access
to the market. Creditworthiness considerations
may, however, make it considerably more difficult
for developing countries to access other financial
markets, particularly for nonstandard contracts and
longer-dated instruments which would allow risk to
be hedged more fully over time. Forward, swap,
and option sales contracts all require consideration
of the counterparty's creditworthiness, and as the
length of a contract and the period of potential
price movement extends out over time, the greater
the risk that an intermediary in over-the-counter
(OTe) markets assumes. In particular, sovereign
risk for contracts with private agents and govern-
48Among countries assisted by the World Bank have been
Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Indonesia, Papua New Guinea,
Poland, Tunisia, and Uganda.
49In Colombia, for example, use of market-based risk man-
agement instruments by the private sector was banned until
1992.
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. ments in developing countries constitutes a serious
obstacle to greater use of OTC markets. Overcom-
ing high levels of sovereign risk by such means as
collateralization and guarantee mechanisms is
being investigated by OTC intermediaries and
international organizations.5o
Government Policies for the Longer
Term
The previous sub-sections have dealt with pol-
icies aimed at mitigating the impact of interna-
tional commodity price variability. But commodity-
exporting countries have also faced a downward
trend in real prices. The earlier analysis suggests
that it would be unwise to base policies on the
assumption that the weakness in real commodity
prices will be quickly overcome. A stronger eco-
nomic recovery (and better growth performance
over the medium term) in the industrial countries
would certainly help, as would continuing high
rates of growth in the newly industrialized coun-
tries. Some supply-side factors may ease over time
(e.g., recent shocks to metals markets from the for-
mer Soviet Union), but other factors (e.g., struc-
tural change in exporting countries and
productivity gains due to technical progress) seem
unlikely to be reversed. If such is the case, those
countries most seriously affected by permanent or
highly persistent commodity price shocks must face
the necessity of adjusting to the shocks and orient-
ing their macroeconomic and structural policies
toward this end.
Therefore, the secular decline in commodity
prices poses the question of what-if any-are the
appropriate structural policies for exporting coun-
tries, in particular those concerning resource real-
location away from primary products and those
involving the type of international trade regime to
be adopted. This was, in fact, a common motivation
for policy initiatives in developing countries,
particularly in Latin America, during the 1960s.
Partially on the basis of the Prebisch-Singer
hypothesis, a large number of Latin American
countries pursued import-substitution strategies
that aimed at reallocating resources away from pri-
mary product production and into heavy industry
and manufactures directed to the domestic market.
But these policies ended, in most cases, in failure as
investments were undertaken in activities where
countries did not enjoy comparative advantage,
and the lack of competition generated stagnation
and technical backwardness. As a result, many
50The International Finance Corporation (IFC), for example,
has recently acted as a guarantor in several commodity swaps
for companies in developing countries .
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Latin American countries have moved toward
more outward-oriented trade regimes in the 1980s
with apparent success.
The lessons from that experience are that while a
negative terms of trade shock is certainly an
adverse development from an exporting country's
viewpoint, adding distortions to the domestic econ-
omy does not make things any better. For example,
if domestic pricing policies insulate producers from
the secular decline in international prices of com-
modities, there will be no incentives for producers
to move toward more profitable activities (at world
prices), eventually resulting in a bigger negative
impact of the price decline. This is a risk for price-
stabilization schemes that, in attempting to smooth
out price fluctuations in the context of a secular
decline, may get into the position of setting pro-
ducer prices at levels that systematically exceed the
international level that can be objectively expected
to prevail.
This does not imply that there are no reasons for
structural policies to target a reallocation of
resources in light of developments in international
commodity markets. It can be argued that an exces-
sive reliance on a few export products can have a
negative impact on the economy as a whole by
increasing the "country risk" factor that is a consid-
eration for international commercial lenders. This
risk affects not just the exporting activity but the
rest of the economy as well, since a balance of pay-
ments crisis would affect the repayment ability of
any economic unit. This type of loss, however,
should be compared with the effect of economic
distortions that could result from efforts by the
state to reallocate resources to other economic
activities. In addition to standard economic argu-
ments, the increasing body of evidence on cross-
country growth performance indicates that distor-
tions to international trade and market-oriented
resource allocation can have important deleterious
effects on economic efficiency.51
In addition, as policies and developments in one
set of exporter countries have repercussions on
others, an issue that can be raised is whether policy
reforms aimed at enhancing growth prospects and
efficiency have improved commodity export per-
formance to the extent of being a major factor in
the decline in commodity prices.52 The aggregate
51See, for example, Lee (1993) and Easterly (1993).
52In the extreme and static version of this argument, demand
is price inelastic and the aggregate supply curve shifts to the
right. The collective result is a reduction in overall commodity
export earnings. However, while demand for a number of com-
modities has been estimated to be price inelastic in the short
run, long-run price elasticities are higher.
supply of primary commodities has indeed been
rising quite sharply in the 1980s and this has quite
clearly contributed to the downward movement in
real commodity prices as evidenced by the econo-
metric analysis presented earlier in this paper.
However, it is not possible to isolate the extent to
which structural reform programs and the
removal of distortions in a number of primary-
producing countries have contributed to the
decline in prices. What can be said is that the
building up of distortions, such as punitive export
taxation in earlier periods, led to lower exports
and a higher price path for certain commodities
than would otherwise have been the case, just as
the removal of distortions may well have led to
higher exports over time and a lower price path. It
should, however, be stressed that in aggregate real
export earnings from commodity exports have
increased over time.
As data that were presented in Chart 3 show, the
growth in the volume of commodity exports has
been fairly uneven across regions. During the past
decade, Asian economies and industrial countries
have led the expansion, with African exports
basically stagnant and Latin American perfor-
mance somewhere in between. It has been
observed that agricultural productivity growth in
Africa has lagged behind that in Asia and Latin
America and that this must constitute a significant
factor in the comparatively weak performance of
export volumes and the loss of market share in tra-
ditional export cropS.53But the implication is that,
while for the economies with higher productivity
growth the observed price declines may not imply
losses in real revenue, economic difficulties would
multiply for countries with poorer productivity
performance.
But, once again, these developments do not
imply that African or other commodity-exporting
countries could make themselves better off by dis-
couraging production of primary goods if that is
where their comparative advantage lies. A relevant
question, however, is whether individual producers
of commodities take account of expected price evo-
lution as a consequence of strategies and develop-
ments in competing countries. This is particularly
relevant for such commodities as metals and tree
crops where gestation periods for new investments
may be extensive and the investments themselves
long-lived. If it can be established that information
failures are important, and to the extent that pol-
icymakers can achieve a better understanding of
commodity price dynamics, policy action would be
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warranted to help to provide better information
and price signals.54
The experience of the fastest-growing develop-
ing countries shows that their export structures
have evolved over time toward greater diversifica-
tion (Tables 1 and 2). But these data show that a
number of countries in Asia considerably increased
primary product export volumes and market shares
and widened the range of primary commodities
they exported, while at the same time diversifying
significantly into manufacturing exports. Latin
American countries did not match this perfor-
mance to the same extent, but a number of coun-
tries in the region enjoyed some success in terms of
diversifying their export structures more toward
manufactures. However, in terms of these yard-
sticks, countries in the African region fared poorly.
One important feature to be noted is that various
types of diversification can take place simul-
taneously. In the agricultural sector, for example,
farmers may respond to incentives to broaden their
crop patterns to increase output of food crops to
meet growing local demand. In many of the poorer
countries, a significant proportion of the growth in
such demand has in the past been met by imports.
Also within the agricultural sector, diversification
can consist of expansion or entry into less tradi-
tional activities (e.g., dairying, aquaculture, hor-
ticulture, fruit growing) on a commercial basis to
satisfy urban demand or to be exported. And lastly,
there is diversification into manufactures and their
export.
54Unfortunately, as Deaton (1992) argues, the dynamics of
adjustments in commodity markets and how longer-term expec-
tations are formed are incompletely understood.
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A recent review by the World Bank of the high-
performing Asian economies provides some guid-
ance as to how diversification was achieved.55 First,
while agriculture's share of output and employment
in these economies has declined significantly over
time, growth in agricultural output and productivity
was much higher than in other developing coun-
tries.56 The governments of these economies pro-
vided support to the agricultural sector through
extension services, agricultural research, pilot
schemes, significant investment in irrigation and
rural infrastructure (roads, bridges, transportation,
electricity, and water supplies), and nonpunitive
crop taxation. Their experience indicates that estab-
lishing a dynamic agricultural sector constitutes an
important phase in the diversification process; for
lower-income countries the message is that failure to
attach a sufficiently high priority to agriculture in
favor of other sectors is likely to be counterproduc-
tive. Second, in addition to policies that generally
provided a stable macroeconomic environment
(including appropriate exchange rates), the high-
performing Asian economies facilitated the more
general process of diversification by public invest-
ment and institution building, by opening up their
economies, by dismantling many of the regulatory
barriers to resource reallocation, and by adopting
policies or reforms that produced fewer distortions
than in many other developing countries.
55This review of the performance of these economies
provides a detailed assessment of the reasons and policies
behind their growth. See The World Bank (1993).
56In fact, Young's (1993) estimates indicate that for the "four
tigers," labor productivity in agriculture increased faster than in
manufacturing. Labor productivity growth reflects both techni-
cal progress and fixed capital investment.
V Conclusion
The analysis in this paper suggests that themarked decline in real commodity prices of
the past decade should be regarded as being largely
of a permanent nature that is not likely to be .
reversed. However, the results do not imply that
commodity prices will continue declining at the
same pace of the last few years. First, as noted in
this paper, the permanent (or trend) component of
commodity prices can (and does) change over time.
Factors influencing the permanent component,
such as agricultural and trade policies of both
exporting and importing countries, may well exert
a more positive influence in the future. For exam-
ple, it is possible that the successful conclusion of
the Uruguay Round bodes well for the prices of
various cereals over the medium term. Second,
cyclical fluctuations still play an important role in
explaining the behavior of commodity prices. Ris-
ing commodity prices have accompanied almost all
the major cyclical upturns in economic activity in
the major industrial countries in the postwar
period. The rebound in real commodity prices dur-
ing the 1993:111-1994:1period by about 10 percent
may be the most recent example of this pattern, as
United States GDP growth accelerated to an
annualized rate of 6.3 percent during the final quar-
ter of 1993.
With regard to the determinants of real com-
modity prices, the paper has emphasized the
important role supply conditions played during the
1980s and, more recently, how developments in the
former Soviet Union have influenced these mar-
kets. Explicit consideration of these factors repre-
sents a first step in broadening the "traditional"
analysis of commodity price behavior, which
tended to focus almost exclusively on demand con-
ditions in the larger industrial. countries. There
remain, however, a number of key areas where the
analysis of commodity prices could be extended.
For instance, it is important to consider explicitly
the role played by international commodity agree-
ments, as it is often acknowledged that the break-
down of several such agreements has contributed
appreciably to the weakness in commodity prices
during the 1980s and 1990s. Similarly, it should
prove useful to examine the direct and indirect
effects of agricultural policies in the .industrial
countries on commodity prices. A better under-
standing of the underlying trends in technology
that influence supply conditions is critical to the
analysis. However, the complex and diverse nature
of the factors that drive commodity markets, and
the fact that some of these (technological changes,
for instance) are hard to quantify, highlight the dif-
ficulties inherent in modeling and forecasting com-
modity prices.
Finally, irrespective of how the underlying trend
in commodity prices evolves over the next few
years, the analysis has also shown that price vol-
atility remains high and that, a priori, there are no
grounds to expect that such price uncertainty will
appreciably diminish in the near future. This fea-
ture of commodity price behavior has increased the
attractiveness of a variety of market-based risk
management instruments. However, legal, finan-
cial, and technical barriers prevent many develop-
ing countries from taking advantage of promising
hedging strategies. Specifically, lack of credit-
worthiness is a problem faced by many low-income,
primary commodity-producing countries. To this
end, it may be fruitful to examine to what extent
international institutions can facilitate these coun-
tries' ability to deal with the problem of highly vol-
atile export prices.
I
Appendix
Table. A I. Country Groupings for Charts 2 and 3
I Developed MarketEconomies Developing Market Economies
America Africa Middle East South and Southeast Asia
Australia Antigua and Barouda Algeria Bahrain Afghanistan, I.S. of
Austria Argentina Angola Cyprus Bangladesh
Belgium Bahamas, The Benin Iran, I.R. of Brunei
Canada Barl>ados Botswana Iraq Cambodia
Denmark Belize Burkina Faso jordan Hong Kong
Faeroe Islands Bermuda Burundi Kuwait India
Finland Bolivia Cameroon Lebanon Indonesia
France Brazil Cape Verde Oman Korea, Republic of
Germany Chile Central African Republic Qatar Lao People's Oem. Rep.
Gibraltar Colombia Chad Saudi Arabia Macau
Greece Costa Rica Comoros Syrian Arab Republic Malaysia
Iceland Cuba Congo Turkey Maldives
Ireland Dominica Cote d'ivoire United Arab Emirates Myanmar
Israel Dominican Republic Djibouti Yemen Nepal
Italy Ecuador Egypt Pakistan
japan EI Salvador Equatorial Guinea Philippines
Netherlands Falkland Islands Ethiopia Singapore
New Zealand French Guiana Gabon Sri Lanka
Norway Greenland Gambia, The Taiwan Provo of China
Portugal Grenada Ghana Thailand
South Africa Guadeloupe Guinea
Spain Guatemala Guinea-Bissau
Sweden Guyana Kenya
Switzerland Haiti Lesotho
United Kingdom Honduras Liberia
United States jamaica Libya
Martinique Madagascar
Mexico Malawi
Montserrat Mali
Netherlands Antilles Mauritania
Nicaragua Mauritius
Panama Morocco
Paraguay Mozambique
Peru Niger
St. Lucia Nigeria
St. Kitts and Nevis Reunion
St. Vincent and the Grenadines Rwanda
Suriname Sao Tome and Principe
Trinidad and Tobago Senegal
Uruguay Seychelles
Venezuela Sierra Leone
Somalia
Sudan
Swaziland
Togo
Tunisia
Uganda
Tanzania
Zai're
Zambia
Zimbabwe
Source: UNCTAD, Handbook of International Trade and Development Statistics (Geneva: UNCTAD, 1993)
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